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IN CRIME’S ARCHIVE 






This article examines the cultural afterlife of criminal evidence. During the criminal 
trial, evidence is adduced by the prosecution in order to narrate and prove the facts 
supporting the charges. Strict rules govern the collection, admission and interpretation 
of evidence at trial, and where evidence has been improperly obtained, or where it may 
be irrelevant or unreliable, or if is misleading, confusing or unfair, the evidence may be 
excluded. However, after the conclusion of the trial, this material returns to a notional 
‘archive’ and sometimes continues to proliferate culturally, but subject to no rules nor 
standards. This article examines some instances in which criminal evidence has been 
accessed and used post-trial, and asks whether these cultural practices constitute risk or 
opportunity, or something more benign. Crime’s archive has aroused the interest of 
artists, publishers, scholars, curators and journalists who have accessed it by various 
methods, and used it for a wide range of purposes, some of which might be 
transgressive, dangerous or insensitive. This article explores what is at stake in 
accessing crime’s archive and prolonging the cultural afterlife of criminal evidence. It 
responds, in part, to Eamonn Carrabine’s call for a ‘critically engaged visual 
criminology’ (2012: 487). For Carrabine, criminology’s ‘cultural turn’ has made 
scholars more attentive to the transformation of ‘traumatic experiences into visual art’ 
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(2012: 486), and he proposes an ethical framework for asking questions about 
representation. This article argues that we might begin this critical engagement by 
inaugurating a jurisprudence of sensitivity, where ‘sensitivity’ is a concept recognised 
by law as justifying limits upon representation or disclosure. Once probative value has 
lapsed, and cultural value is ascribed to some items of criminal evidence, this article 
shows how a ‘sensitive jurisprudence’ might make us attentive to the potential harm 
done by retrieving this material from crime’s archive.    
Central to this article is the question: What can be done in crime’s archive? Public 
records and legal process are presumptively open and transparent, but material therein 
might be private, personal, sensitive or humiliating. Archive laws and practices 
recognise the concepts of ‘privacy’, ‘personal information’ and ‘sensitive information’ 
and use these to guide decisions about access and use. However, these concepts do not 
anticipate the projects of the archive’s creative users, allowing this material to slip into 
the cultural sphere. Whilst this article does not argue against the release of criminal 
archival material, it demands that any release is nevertheless sensitive to the 
consequences that may flow.  Part I is a case study, illustrating what I argue is an 
insensitive cultural use of crime’s archive. Part II shows a wider range of cultural uses 
of criminal evidence and situates those cultural practices within some contemporary 
cultural theories and practices relating to ‘archives’. Part III explores ‘open justice’ as a 
mechanism for opening the legal archive, and explains how open justice has failed to 
address the practices of cultural users of crime’s archive. Part IV then proposes a 
‘jurisprudence of sensitivity’ by surveying how ‘sensitivity’ currently operates as a legal 
concept within open justice, and then pushes that concept closer towards the possibility 
3 
 
of identifying the harm that is sometimes done when criminal evidence leads a cultural 
afterlife. 
 
I. Perverting the course of justice 
This article opens with a case study with the aim of illustrating one instance in which 
criminal evidence captures the imagination of both legal and cultural users. Henry 
Bond’s book Lacan at the Scene (2009) represents an instance in which photographic 
evidence taken for a criminal investigative purpose is re-used for a cultural theoretical 
enterprise. Whereas the original material is already violent, profane, and violates 
crime’s victims, this article argues that Bond’s re-use is insensitive, for the way it reifies 
transgression, and does so without adequate justification. Nevertheless, Bond’s 
endeavour highlights a new range of concepts and questions which, despite a growing 
cultural hunger for criminal archival materials, have failed to be addressed by the legal 
institutions which create and preserve these records. 
Researching his book Lacan at the Scene, Henry Bond visited the British National 
Archive and sought access to English murder case files between 1955 and 1970. He was 
looking for files which contained original crime scene photographs. The cases he 
examined had been ‘solved’ in the judicial sense – the perpetrators of these homicides 
had either pleaded guilty or they were convicted following a trial. However, Bond had 
the idea that the photographs in the files contained further ‘clues’ which, when 
subjected to Lacanian readings, would enable him to diagnose the perpetrators as 
neurotic, psychotic or perverse. 
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Bond’s book opens: ‘I begin with a novel and engaging premise: what if Jacques Lacan 
– the brilliant and eccentric Parisian psychoanalyst - had left his home in the early 
1950s in order to travel to England and work as a police detective? How might he have 
applied his theories in order to solve crimes?’ (Bond, 2009: 1) Bond concedes, in his 
second paragraph, that his research has a ‘flippant or comedic starting point’ and he 
describes the process by which he re-photographed the archival images, enabling him to 
‘reenter’ the crime scenes ‘capturing my own evidence’ (Bond, 2009: 5). Although I am 
cautious not to present the view that law’s use of this evidence is unproblematic, (see 
Biber, 2007) my purpose here is to show that we ought to remain vigilant against post-
legal uses which, in their refusal of law’s limits, also refuse all sensitivity towards law’s 
subjects. Bond is fascinated by sexual homicide, and his text is accompanied by many 
photographs taken from criminal case files, in which the murdered corpses of rape 
victims are reproduced, usually in full-page images. Of course, these images had 
already been displayed years earlier, for police investigators, prosecutors, judges and 
jurors, and that earlier exhibition – albeit with the justification of criminal process – 
constituted the creation of this archive of violence and violation. However, I argue that 
Bond’s re-use of this archive is without adequate justification; a veneer of 
psychoanalytic theory loosely disguises his own fascination with (mostly) women who 
are murdered, (mostly) by their rapists. These images, I argue, and also Bond’s analysis 
of them, are harmful for the manner in which they degrade, shame and sometimes mock 
these victims of sexual homicide. 
Here is an example of one of Bond’s investigations, conducted over slightly fewer than 
three pages, accompanied by three photographs, at the end of which Bond concludes 
that a homicidal rapist is a pervert: A woman was travelling on a train between Sussex 
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and Surrey in 1965. A male passenger made a sexual advance towards her – ‘What 
about it?’ – which she declined. He raped and killed her. Bond reproduces two images 
of the woman’s body on the carriage floor, partially wedged beneath the seat, her 
clothing in a humiliating state of disarray, her handbag on the seat above her. Bond 
imagines the ‘quasi-intimacy’ of the train compartment, and speculates that the woman 
was a ‘seemingly flirtatious stranger’, and provocatively describes this crime as an 
‘inversion’ of ‘the romantic notion of the chance encounter with a stranger on a train’ 
(Bond, 2009: 53). He writes, ‘finally these strangers did form a lasting relationship, but 
only as perpetrator and deceased’ (Bond, 2009: 53).  
Bond’s analysis is not interested in rape and murder; it is in the visual representation of 
these crimes’ effects in the crime scene photographs. He notices that, in the 
photographs, the victim’s ‘skirt [is] pulled up to reveal underwear, stockings, garter, and 
so on’ (Bond, 2009: 53, 57); the description is gratuitous as the photographs he 
reproduces spare none of these details. Bond spends the rest of his analysis of this case 
examining graffiti scratched on the door of the train compartment, reproduced in his 
third photograph. He describes the graffiti, variously, as ‘obscene/erotic’ (Bond, 2009: 
57), as ‘erotic/obscene’ (Bond, 2009: 58), as a depiction of ‘gang rape’ (Bond, 2009: 
57), as ‘violent rape’ (Bond, 2009: 58), and as ‘the residue of a perverse act’ (emphasis 
in original) (Bond, 2009: 57). He is interested in the ‘exhibitionistic dimension’ of 
graffiti, and wants to ‘creat[e] a dialogue’ between the drawing and the murder scene,  
both of which he describes as ‘depictions’ of a ‘similar fantasy scenario’ (Bond, 2009: 
57). Drawing a bizarre analogy with Steven Spielberg’s film Close Encounters of the 
Third Kind, Bond becomes interested in the shift from two-dimensional to three-
dimensional representation, writing: ‘It is as if the drawing of a violent rape were 
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escalated’; for Bond it is the ‘escalation’ of a ‘fantasy’ into ‘reality’ that confirms the 
diagnosis of the pervert. He speculates: ‘Perhaps this erotic/obscene drawing was 
produced by the murderer while traveling sometime before on a familiar train journey – 
as if he responded to the graffiti/diagram next to his seat by posing a brusque rhetorical 
question: “Does not one perverse image demand another?”’ (emphasis in original) 
(Bond, 2009: 58). 
This concludes Bond’s analysis. He moves swiftly on to his next violent sexual 
homicide ‘investigation’, accompanied by further abject, humiliating and – frankly – 
heartbreaking crime scene photographs. Bond’s book is not consigned to the 
‘cult/alternative’ genre, as has applied to other books he identifies and which are 
characterised – just as his book is – by their prurient and possibly perverted fascination 
with rape and murder (Bond, 2009: 26). His book is published by the MIT Press, in its 
Short Circuits series, edited and with an enthusiastic Forward by Slavoj Žižek. Žižek’s 
contribution opens: ‘The only thing I feel qualified to add to Henry Bond’s outstanding 
book is what I see as its philosophical presupposition: the weird status of the camera’s 
eye’ (Bond, 2009: xi). The remainder of Žižek’s contribution is about himself and his 
own preoccupations – Proust, sex gadgets, Soviet silent cinema, Deleuze, Kant – before 
he concludes: ‘what makes [the crime scene photographs] so unsettling is that they 
record traces of something we cannot really accept as an actual event, or grasp how it 
could have happened’ (Bond, 2009: xv). 
In Lacan at the Scene, both Bond and Žižek inexplicably, ‘cannot really accept’ – that 
these photographs do represent ‘actual events’; they represent aggravated sexual 
assaults, intimate-partner homicides, and murders by strangers, almost of all of which 
are perpetrated upon women. The author, editor and publisher have forgotten that the 
7 
 
reality and gravity of these crimes demands sensitivity, and they have collaborated in 
displaying the violated corpse of each woman repeatedly, cruelly and without any 
reflection upon the trauma she has suffered (Bond, 2009: 37-8). The book is, for this 
reader, a depraved and degrading celebration of sexualised homicide, whose victims are 
little more than ludic pawns in a Lacan-lite parlour game. Bond’s enjoyment of his 
project – the book’s endnotes are crammed with his boundless edification – and its 
scholarly façade, gives rise to serious questions about whether and where limits might 
be drawn around the re-use of evidence from sexual trauma. One value of Bond’s book 
is that it has provoked these questions, some of which this article begins to address. 
Several of the book’s reviewers do not share my concerns:  Daniel Hourigan, who 
noticed that the book was a ‘sometimes gruesome read’ and that the photographs were 
‘abject depictions’, nevertheless concluded that the images ‘always remain objects of a 
most critical and tasteful engagement’ (Hourigan, 2010). Similarly, Owen Hewitson 
conceded the book’s ‘disturbing content’, but believed ‘Bond is careful […] to be 
sensitive to his subject matter and to avoid any hint of the callous voyeurism or noir 
pastiche that is a familiar cliché of the detective fiction genre’ (Hewitson, 2011: 109-
111). Neither reviewer explains how photographs of real rape and murder might be 
displayed in a ‘tasteful’ or ‘sensitive’ mode. Whereas the heft of this volume derives 
from the truth of these images – they really are probative of rape and murder – its 
reviewers go to some effort to show that these images might be experienced 
theoretically. Bond himself engages in some meretricious taunting of his readers on this 
issue. He asks: ‘Do you not, gentle reader, feel a little dirty as you browse the lurid 
images? You may also notice that my version of this conscious justification is that I 
present the photographs as part of a Freudo-Lacanian study’ (Bond, 2009: 197 footnote 
8 
 
104, emphasis in original). In her review, Margaret Kinsman represses her own 
revulsion: ‘Although still very hard to look at – they are, quite frankly, gruesome – with 
the passage of time, these photos have acquired a historical patina that distances one 
from how they show the events they depict’ (Kinsman, 2010: 116); repressing affect 
with critique, she then describes Bond’s writing as ‘stimulating, creative and unsettling 
in an interesting manner. His approach evokes a kind of aesthetic pleasure, which 
unsettles even as it satisfies’ (Kinsman, 2010: 116). In her review, Viola Brisolin – who 
briefly raises the charge of Bond’s own voyeurism before acquitting him of it – 
overstates his scholarly achievements here: ‘Bond’s rigorous method and resolute 
approach’; his ‘deft … moves’ and ‘skilful interpretations’. Brisolin refers to the raped 
and murdered women as ‘The objects depicted in these images’ (Brisolin, 2011: 672). 
Like the book’s other champions, including Žižek, and his dust-jacket patrons, Victor 
Burgin, Bruce Fink and Dylan Evans, some of the book’s reviewers seem to have been 
beguiled by Bond just as, for Lacan, the pervert and his audience are drawn into a 
symbiotic mutuality.   
Of course, these women are not now, and never were, objects, and their relocation from 
criminal case files into cultural theory is, for this reader, neither tasteful nor sensitive. 
Lacan at the Scene takes criminal evidence, initially gathered for the purpose of 
investigating and prosecuting homicide, and puts it to a gruesome new purpose. Bond 
repeatedly remarks upon the bewilderment of the archivists he confronted, and his 
frustration at their attempts to place restrictions upon his requests to access these files, 
suggesting emphatically that these bureaucratic philistines are impeding his crucial 
theoretical endeavour. Among those Bond thanks in his ‘Acknowledgements’ is Luc 
Sante, who probably inaugurated the practice of making coffee-table books out of crime 
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scene photographs, with his books Low Life and Evidence (Sante, 1992, 2003). Bond 
cites several other books in this burgeoning genre (Bond, 2009: 197 footnotes 104, 
106), and he explains that his book originated in his Ph.D research in a UK university 
(Bond, 2009: 203 footnote 53). And so, whilst Bond’s project represents for this reader 
the comprehensive failure of administrative, scholarly and ethical standards to prevent 
the post-trial mis-use of criminal evidence – nobody stopped him; some cheered from 
the sidelines – his is not the only work in which criminal evidence has re-appeared in a 
cultural setting, with troubling consequences. One aim of this article is to highlight the 
difficulty of distinguishing those re-uses which are mis-uses without some guidance 
about how one might exercise sensitivity within crime’s archive. It also needs repeating 
that lawful uses might, in some accounts, also constitute mis-uses. 
II. Cultural uses of crime’s archive 
Bond is just one in a flourishing field of artists and other creative and scholarly 
practitioners whose work draws upon official records, but who aims to put these 
materials into fresh, often unanticipated, contexts.  Some of this work is shocking, for 
instance in its graphic displays of sexual violence and homicide (see Biber, 2010), its 
wilful aggravation of the traumatic circumstances from which it arose, (see Scott Bray, 
2011; Biber, 2006a; Biber and Dalton, 2009c; Anita & Beyond, 2003; Birmingham, 
2012) or for the illicit means by which it was obtained by its creative users (see Biber, 
2011c). Some of this work actively interrogates the implicit logics of the archive from 
which it was recovered (Jones, 1986/2007, Tearoom; see Biber and Dalton 2009; Biber, 
2011a), or forces new logics to prevail (Justice & Police Museum exhibitions Crimes of 
Passion 2002-2003; City of Shadows, 2006; Doyle, 2005, 2009; see Biber 2006b, 
2011b; Maley, 2007; Safe, 2011; Crerar, 2012). Some of this work grapples with the 
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accusations of voyeurism that arise when one looks without permission (Hanrahan, 
1999). All of this work transgresses the limits that the law would impose upon access, 
use and interpretation of evidence. This article acknowledges the shared interests of 
legal and non-legal users of criminal evidence, but also recognises that there is often a 
point at which our concerns conflict. It asks whether, where and how some new limits 
might be drawn to confine or control our mutual fascination with criminal evidence, and 
our current misunderstanding or refusal of each others’ motivations. It proposes a 
‘jurisprudence of sensitivity’ to open this dialogue. It must also be noted that legal and 
non-legal users are not necessarily separate cohorts; law and culture are always and 
already interdependent. 
Cultural users of criminal evidence give us new concepts for thinking about this 
material. They may use evidence aesthetically, historically, politically, theoretically; 
they may see value in abstracting a single moment from an evidentiary narrative and – 
redacting context and explanation – working with that; they may be looking for 
evidence of something else – a lost history, everyday habits, even psychoanalytic 
diagnosis. No longer seeking to resolve facts in issue, cultural users of criminal 
evidence provoke other responses: affect, arousal, curiosity, nostalgia, pleasure. 
Furthermore, and which is explored in more detail in the next section, post-trial 
deployments of criminal evidence create a conflict between existing concepts in the 
administration of criminal justice, between transparency and secrecy, between the ideals 
of open justice and the protection of confidences.  
The socio-legal discourse of ‘open justice’ and the cultural-political discourse of 
‘transparency’, have emerged concurrently with a broader cultural sensibility, one that 
has been called the ‘archival turn’ (Stoler, 2002: 87, 95), the ‘archival impulse’ (Foster, 
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2004), and ‘archive fever’ (Derrida, 1995). Whilst not precisely synonymous, these 
terms collectively acknowledge the process by which we create a fetish of the stored 
document and the repository in which it is stored. Institutions holding medical scientific 
collections, human remains and indigenous cultural heritage have already undergone 
long processes for the development of guidelines and frameworks for decision-making 
about access, display and use of their collections. Elsewhere, public archives and 
collections oscillate between traditional policies of restriction and emerging missions of 
generosity; as collections move online, a new discursive idiom develops: ‘generous 
interfaces’, ‘sharing abundantly’, ‘rich content’, ‘show everything’ (Whitelaw, 2011). 
Courts and legal archives have yet to resolve their processes for permitting post-trial 
access and use of their records. In the absence of any formal rules, guidelines or 
legislation permitting access to, and use of, criminal evidence, knowledge about 
decision-making and actual use of this material is anecdotal and arbitrary. 
Within the visual arts through the 20th century, the archive had been the site of repeated 
return by artists confronting history, historicity, order, linearity, time and bureaucracy. 
Artists including Christian Boltanski, Joseph Beuys and Gerhard Richter used archival 
fragments in an attempt to memorialise the past (see, for example, Buchloh, 1999). This 
archival fascination continued into the 21st century, where manipulation, citation and 
documentation became widely-practiced artistic techniques. Archival materials formed 
the basis for transgressively-imagined pasts, as in the work of Tom Sachs (Giftgas 
Giftset, 1998; Prada Deathcamp, 1998) and Alan Schechner (It’s the Real Thing – Self-
Portrait at Buchenwald, 1993), who played with alternate-endings or aesthetic aspects 
of the Nazi Holocaust (Biber, 2009a), and for which they and other artists were accused 
of ‘toxic narcissism’ (Schjeldahl, 2002: 87), ‘sheer stupidity’ and were ‘not to be 
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forgiven’ (Kramer, 2002). Some artists riffed on the stark disjuncture between the 
notoriety of certain crimes and the banality of the criminal evidence produced to prove 
them: Richard Barnes repeatedly photographed Ted Kaczynski’s Montana cabin after it 
was taken into evidence (Unabomber, 1998); Christian Patterson produced a photobook 
of redneck sentimentality memorialising the 1957-58 murder spree of Charles 
Starkweather and Caril Ann Fugate (Patterson, 2011); Jamie Wagg enhanced 
photographs taken from security cameras showing the two-year-old James Bulger being 
led away to his death by two ten-year-olds, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson 
(‘History Painting, Shopping Mall 15:42:32, 12/02/93, 1993-4; ‘History Painting’, 
Railway Line, 1993-4), which were heavily criticised by Bulger’s family and the 
exhibition’s sponsors (Cusick, 1994; McGrath, 2004). Numerous artists have used the 
crime scene as a site of creative engagement, re-photographing locations in which 
homicides occurred in order to produce a new claim upon forensic aesthetics; this is 
evident in the work of Taryn Simon (The Innocents, 2003) or Teresa Margolles (¿De 
qué otra cosa podríamos hablar?/What Else Could We Talk About?, 2009), who made 
direct interventions into miscarriages of justice (Biber, 2006a; Scott Bray, 2007; Scott 
Bray, 2009), as well as Angela Strassheim (Evidence, 2009), Eva Frapiccini (Muri di 
piombo, 2003-2006)), Deborah Luster (Tooth for an Eye, 2010) and Krista Wortendyke 
(Killing Season: Chicago, 2010-2011), each of whom invokes some kind of affective 
motivation for her ‘return’ to the crime scene. Ross Gibson and Kate Richards, in their 
ongoing collaboration, Life After Wartime (1998 - ), re-present original Australian crime 
scene photographs in various formats: as interactive database, with musical 
improvisation, as immersive environment or as algorithmic story-engine, seeing in this 
material a ‘world full of yearning, folly, mendacity and nobility’ (Gibson and Richards, 
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1998). Corinne May Botz, in The Nutshell Studies of Unexplained Death (2004), 
photographed miniature crime scene models constructed in the 1940s and 1950s by 
Frances Glessner Lee, who had based her models upon actual homicide and death 
scenes. Whereas Lee’s intention behind building her models was to create training tools 
for detectives, Botz’s project functions simultaneously as a tribute to Lee – an 
experimental criminologist – and a celebration of Lee’s meticulous, intricate, 
obsessively-detailed models (Botz, 2004).  
Sven Spieker, author of The Big Archive: Art from Bureaucracy (2008), identifies two 
dominant twentieth-century views of the archive. The first is ‘a giant filing cabinet at 
the center of a reality founded on ordered rationality’; the second is ‘a giant paper jam 
based on the exponential increase in stored data’ (Spieker, 2008: 5. See also Schaffner 
and Winzen, 1998). Okwui Enwezor, curator of Archive Fever: Uses of the Document in 
Contemporary Art (2008), describes ‘fascination with the archive, the inimitable 
madness of the archive, the constant return to it for verification, inspiration, and source’ 
(Enwezor, 2008: 35). Guest editor for Artlink’s ‘Mining the Archive’ issue, Zara 
Stanhope, referred to ‘outsider tactics’ in which artists engaged in ‘disruptive’ 
engagement with archives, ‘mimicking’, ‘dismantling’, ‘intervene[ing]’, or ‘placing 
themselves on the fringes of the museum’ in a relationship that is self-reflexive, critical 
or ironic, or where archival institutions actively collaborate with artists in this manner, 
the artistic potential for archival resources is, she concludes, ‘boundless and 
uncontrollable’ (Stanhope, 1999: 8-9. See also Photofile, 2005 and Source, 2012).  
For artists, but also for lawyers, journalists, publishers, curators and scholars, the 
document in the archive has the attributes of authenticity, contemporaneity, and the 
unique tangibility of a real moment captured in material form. These attributes form the 
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basis for the strict interpretive limits imposed by the rules of evidence and criminal 
procedure. These rules, of course, cannot hope to contain the other attributes of the 
archival document, those that make it so irresistible as the basis for creative work: 
beauty, violence, surprise, shame, volume, and the promise that it contains an 
irresistible secret.  
III. Open justice and its exceptions 
Where criminal evidence leads a cultural afterlife, we find the intersection of two 
contemporary phenomena: ‘open justice’ and ‘open secrets’. ‘Open justice’ demands 
transparency about court procedures and access to court information; the term ‘open 
secrets’ acknowledges that public records sometimes demand tact or sensitivity about 
the secrets they contain (see Sedgwick, 1993; Biber and Dalton, 2009c; Young, 2011). 
This delicate balance arises in other legal contexts and is reflected in the need to regard 
certain disclosures as ‘privileged’ or ‘protected’, and where the benefit or interest in 
disclosure is weighed against the benefit or interest in restriction. It is a balance that has 
been criticised in instances where legal proceedings have continued despite some of the 
evidence been kept ‘secret’ from one of the parties (Biber, 2009b; Kumar, 2011). And it 
is a balance that was recently attempted, without success, in New South Wales (NSW), 
in Australia’s first attempt to achieve ‘open justice’ through legislation. Despite 
unanimous parliamentary support, the Court Information Act 2010 (NSW) (‘the Act’) 
that attempted to make court records easily and consistently accessible appears unlikely 
ever to come into force, unless amended (Court Information Act, 2010, NSW). The Act 
and its failure might be regarded as an experiment with regulating crime’s archive. The 
Act was developed without any consultation with, or recognition of, cultural or creative 
users of court information. Nor did it acknowledge the undiminished fervour, within the 
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humanities and creative arts, for treating official records as ‘open secrets’. These 
archives, including a very significant amount of legal evidence used in criminal trials, 
provide a rich basis for creative and scholarly enterprises, and this work has, to date, 
flourished without any consistent decision-making about access to, or restrictions upon, 
court information (Biber, 2011a). Further, in the absence of coherent legal or 
administrative responses to these practices, a confusing range of property rights have 
been assumed by creative users of archival or ‘found’ or ‘readymade’ objects; 
copyright, moral rights, and proceeds-of-crime provisions, for instance, neither 
anticipate nor regulate some of the property claims that are asserted by cultural agents.  
In 2010, with ambitions to set a new national benchmark in freedom of information, 
NSW attempted to legislate in order to achieve consistency and transparency in 
decision-making about access to court records. The result of substantial reports and 
studies (NSW Law Reform Commission, 2003; Supreme Court of NSW, 2004; 
Attorney General’s Department of NSW, 2006, 2008), the Court Information Act 
aspired to ‘open justice’, which is the belief that accountability and legitimacy can be 
achieved by creating a public right to scrutinise court proceedings and decisions. The 
Act was a response to pressure from media organisations. The Act passed through 
Parliament with cross-party support (NSW Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates, 
2010: 22800-4) however it has still not been proclaimed.  
Court registrars accused legislators of not addressing the resource burden imposed by 
the Act’s implementation, and journalists argued that the Act had always harboured 
parliament’s ill-will towards the media (see, for example, Merritt, 2011). The Act is 
now stuck in a rare deadlock. Delays in the Act’s commencement have been attributed, 
by media commentators, to ‘operational practicalities’; the NSW Department of 
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Attorney General and Justice eventually acknowledged ‘implementation issues’ (Moran, 
2011).  
The Act recognises that ‘open justice’ needs to be balanced against legitimate reasons 
for restriction, which might include privacy, personal or sensitive information, improper 
use, and concerns about material of specific kinds (for instance, video footage, police 
fact sheets, or malicious pleadings unsupported by admissible evidence). It appreciates 
that information relating to victims of crime, medical and psychological reports, 
criminal records, and visual and photographic material, harbours additional dangers.  
There is no common law right to access court documents or material in Australia (R 
Lucas & Son (Nelson Mail) Ltd v O’Brien: 305-307, in Attorney General’s Review, 
2006: 11. See also Spigelman CJ in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd & 2 Ors v Ryde 
Local Court & 3 Ors [2005] NSWCA 10, in Attorney General’s Review, 2006: 11). 
Under various legislative provisions, an applicant needs to demonstrate that they have 
‘sufficient interest in the proceedings’ (Rule 36.12 of Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
2005, cited in Attorney General’s Review, 2006: 13; see also Australian Conservation 
Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493), or a ‘proper interest in the 
proceedings’ (Local Court Criminal Proceedings Rules, cited in Attorney General’s 
Review, 2006: 13), although the range and depth of interest invoked by these provisions 
is not defined. In the United States, however, there is a presumption of access to all 
public records, achieved through freedom of information legislation, but drawing upon 
principles said to pre-date the Constitution and with origins in the English common law 
(Conley et al., 2011: 772-847, but see also 787, footnote 63, reference to Zenith Radio). 
Whilst a ‘legitimate interest’ in the public record must generally be demonstrated, 
Conley et al, explain the considerations that might apply where access is limited: 
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‘safety, stigma, shame, unfair disadvantage, and reputational damage’ (Conley et al, 
2011: 826). Where the identity of rape victims is involved, further grounds for 
restriction might include ‘the negative judgment of their communities, and chilling 
effects’ (Conley et al., 2011: 825). In the United Kingdom, open justice principles have 
recently been confronted by proposals to expand the range of processes which allow for 
secret evidence to be adduced, known as ‘closed material procedures’, taking the 
extraordinary measures developed in a counter-terrorism context and applying them 
more broadly in some civil and coronial proceedings (Scott Bray and Martin, 2012).  
The Act takes a very limited approach to terms such as ‘private’, ‘personal’ and 
‘sensitive’ and has not applied nuanced scholarly attempts to carve out a private realm 
in public or online spaces (Nissenbaum, 1998, 2004, 2010). In the work of Helen 
Nissenbaum, for instance, she distinguishes intrusions by certain (usually state) agents 
from intrusions into private or personal spaces, and also – relevantly – intrusions that 
arise ‘when the information in question meets societal standards of intimacy, sensitivity 
or confidentiality’ (Nissenbaum, 2004: 128). By focusing upon the integrity of the 
information in its own context, Nissenbaum proposes that we can recognise ‘norms of 
information flow’ within that context (Nissenbaum, 2004: 137), and that privacy 
violations will occur where contextual informational norms are transgressed 
(Nissenbaum, 2004: 138).  
IV. Proposing a jurisprudence of sensitivity 
Whether some of the cultural re-uses of crime’s archive constitute ‘transgressions’ 
might be resolved by developing a jurisprudence of sensitivity, within a socio-legal 
discourse of ‘openness’ and ‘secrecy’ (Young, 2011: 57-74). This article calls for 
18 
 
further work in this direction, and itself represents a preliminary setting-out of the issues 
at stake.  
‘Sensitivity’ is a concept recognised by the laws and practices dealing with information 
management. Where information is stored or governed by public agencies, rules and 
guidelines attempt to manage the flow of that data: between or within agencies, between 
agencies and individuals, across borders, or otherwise. In jurisdictions where freedom-
of-information functions presumptively, there are limited categories which function as 
exceptions to this presumption of openness. Whilst terminology varies, in general these 
exceptions include: privacy, personal information, health records, protected 
confidences, trade secrets, disclosures against the public interest, or matters of national 
security. Where an exception applies, the information might not be disclosed, or it 
might be edited or redacted before disclosure. Usually, where information is disclosed, 
it must be disclosed unconditionally. 
Whilst jurisdictions differ in their rules and their terminology, it is illustrative to see the 
operation of the concept ‘sensitive’ under several Australian legal instruments. For 
example, the soon-to-commence Australian Privacy Principles retain a distinction 
between ‘sensitive information’ and ‘personal information’; ‘sensitive information’ is 
personal information that is also information or an opinion about an individual’s: racial 
or ethnic origin; political opinions; membership of a political association; religious 
beliefs or affiliations; philosophical beliefs; membership of a professional or trade 
association; membership of a trade union; sexual preferences or practices (soon to be 
replaced with ‘sexual orientation or practices’); criminal record; or health information; 
genetic information; biometric information or biometric templates (Currently Privacy 
Act 1998 (Cth), Schedule 3). Under the Australian Government’s Information Security 
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Management Guidelines, information in need of increased security may be subject to 
dissemination limiting markers (DLM), specifying disclosure restraints or special 
handling. Five categories of DLM are used: For Official Use Only; Sensitive; Sensitive: 
Personal; Sensitive: Legal; and Sensitive: Cabinet. Where information is marked 
‘Sensitive: Personal’, the definition of ‘sensitive’ aligns with that in the privacy 
provisions, above (Australian Government, 2011). 
In NSW, ‘sensitivity’ operates as a factor when weighing the public interest in the 
disclosure of health records in the context of health research. For example, information 
may be ‘of a particularly personal or sensitive nature’ if it involves: children or young 
people; persons with intellectual or psychiatric disability; persons highly dependent on 
medical care; persons in dependent or unequal relationships; persons who are members 
of collectivities; Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples; persons whose 
information relates to their mental or sexual health; or persons who are incarcerated 
(Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), Guideline 4.4(d)). Other 
Australian jurisdictions have similar or analogous provisions, and these are found in 
instruments governing ‘privacy’ or ‘information privacy’.  
It is evident that, whilst the concept of ‘sensitivity’ is recognised by law, it is a limited 
one and, contrary to ordinary understandings of the word ‘sensitive’, it attempts to be 
sensitive only to considerations within a limited list. I propose that a jurisprudence of 
sensitivity places pressure upon the existing legal concept of ‘sensitivity’ in order to 
bring it within the broader ambit of a sensory jurisprudence; that is, a jurisprudence 
connected with the senses, perceptible by the senses, endowed with the faculty of 
sensation; a jurisprudence that feels quickly and acutely. Listing what is ‘sensitive’ is an 
intellectual undertaking; recognising what is ‘sensitive’ demands feeling something. A 
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jurisprudence of sensitivity recognises sensibilities, emotions and harm. It 
acknowledges the special susceptibility of some individuals, especially those whose 
context or experience makes them vulnerable in some circumstances. It recognises that 
certain materials require special care, delicate handling, tact (derived in part from 
Oxford English Dictionary, 2000 - ). 
Both legal and cultural enterprises are capable of sensitivity, and this capacity offers a 
pathway through the potentially dangerous or harmful space in which criminal evidence 
continues to survive after the expiry of its probative value. Sensitivity offers an 
alternative to the underlying binaries at stake here – open/closed, public/private, 
transparency/secrecy – which, when pressed, turn out to be pointless or false. 
Criminology could achieve a timely intervention into a dialogue that has begun within 
cultural and political theory, following Clare Birchall’s position that ‘secrecy or 
transparency?’ is a false choice (Birchall, 2011a), and that we live with the tensions and 
contradictions between these positions (Birchall, 2011b). Better ways of protecting what 
is important to us might be achieved through acts of sensitivity. By way of example, 
Desmond Manderson – who uses the term ‘judgment’ to capture a part of what I 
propose with the term ‘sensitivity’ –  explores the literary and rhetorical moves by 
which ‘judgment’ is reached when there is no ‘right answer’ (Manderson, 2010: 496). 
For Manderson, justice is not found in the judgment as decision but in the doubt and 
challenge from which it resulted: the process. But Manderson identifies the significance 
of ‘justification, reason-giving, and resistance’ as characterising the process of 
judgment, and he opposes the view of judgment as ‘closure and finality’ (Manderson, 
2010: 513). By focusing here upon the process of judgment that lies behind the cultural 
re-use of criminal evidence, we confront the decision made by the cultural user about 
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what they’ve chosen to show, but we don’t necessarily understand their process of 
judgment. We cannot know much about their sensitivities or suspectibilities; we only 
know how their work makes us feel. And so, often instinctively, we pass judgment upon 
them: what kind of person would show this? 
In judging Henry Bond, this process of judging might be assisted by some sensitivity to 
what Bond chose to conceal. Returning to his example of the woman murdered on the 
train, it is important to understand what Bond might easily have learned and revealed 
about that case, but didn’t. The rape and murder of Patricia W. on a Friday evening in 
September 1965 acquired the media label ‘The Gatwick Train Murder’.1 She was a 28-
year-old trainee schoolteacher who had been reading a book when Michael Gills 
interrupted her with his sexual advance: “What about it?” She rebuffed him, and he 
stabbed her repeatedly to death, sexually assaulted her, cut her throat, then left her body 
in a degrading state of exposure. Police with tracker dogs searched the line and 
conducted house-to-house enquiries (see for example: JISC Media Hub, 6 Sept 1965, 
18). They found the contents of her handbag at Three Bridges, but her killer was not 
identified until 10 months later when Gills, in prison for another offence, confessed to 
the crime. He was convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility and sentenced to 15 years in prison, of which he served 11, before his 
release in 1977. In his police record of interview in 1966, Gills had said, ‘She snubbed 
me. [...] Women treated me like a leper. All the hate and resentment I had for women 
came into my head. I stabbed her’ (see, for instance, contemporaneous media report at 
JISC Media Hub, 1 Aug 1966, 14. See also Pulp International, 2010).   
                                                          
1 Some jurisdictions have rules against disclosing the name or identity of a sexual assault victim or 
complainant. Whilst Patricia W’s full name was published in the media at the time of her rape and 
murder, I have not done so here. 
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Following his release Gills, then known as ‘Steve’ or ‘Stephen’, worked as an animal 
wrangler or ‘beastman’ in the Chipperfield Circus. In 1997 the circus was infiltrated by 
undercover animal welfare activists from the organisation Animal Defenders who, over 
a period of four months, secretly filmed over 400 hours of video footage. Much of this 
footage showed Gills committing acts of cruelty upon animals – a baby chimpanzee, a 
camel, a sick elephant, among others. Gills admitted his guilt against six charges of 
cruelty to four elephants, and he was convicted. In separate proceedings his two 
employers denied their charges, and experts including Dame Jane Goodall were called 
by prosecutors to testify about what they saw in the footage: gratuitous violence, and 
inexcusable despair and terror that Gills and his accomplices had perpetrated upon the 
animals (BBC, 1999). Gills had beaten an elephant so hard with a metal bar that the bar 
broke. One of the undercover workers told a reporter, ‘He even boasted to me about the 
best place to hit [an elephant] for maximum impact’ (Pisa, 1999). Footage showed Gills 
hit an elephant 12 times with a metal bar, shouting ‘You’ll never learn’. Another report 
said that, after chasing an elephant around a small cage, Gills shouted, ‘I don't f***ing 
listen to you. F***ing c***, you're going to get it right across the f***ing earhole’ 
(Armstrong, 1998, expurgation in original). Elsewhere, he was shown hitting elephants 
with a broom, shovel and pitchfork (Carter, 1999). He was also shown hitting a 
chicken’s head against a wall (Watson-Smyth, 1999). The director of Animal 
Defenders, Jan Creamer, told the BBC: ‘Steve Gills said it was because he was 
depressed and he took it out on the animals’ (Storer, 2002). Gills was sentenced to four 
months in prison for animal cruelty. In yet another bewildering twist, in 2007 a 
newspaper reported that Gills, by then a pensioner, had been assaulted by a group of 
youths after his ex-girlfriend had spread rumours that he was a convicted paedophile. 
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He told reporters, ‘I pass people in the street and they look at me as though I'm a bit of 
dirt. They all turn around and stare’ (Crawley Observer, 2007). 
And so, whilst the criminal evidence adduced against Michael Gills for the rape and 
killing of Patricia W. did lead a cultural afterlife, Henry Bond’s project missed it 
altogether. Whereas Bond’s mission took him into the criminal archive, immersed him 
in cultural and psychoanalytic theories, giving it the kind of genre-slashing quirks that 
might attract the MIT Press, a far more substantial, horrifying and perverse story could 
have been gleaned from the prosaic news archive. It isn’t that Bond’s cultural re-
working of criminal evidence cannot be done; it’s that his work ought to be sensitive to 
– and judged against – what would have been better. 
It is not only a legally-oriented perspective on criminal evidence that feels troubled by 
post-trial uses of crime’s archive. This is a debate within the creative arts as well. David 
Campany, a photographer and scholar, has urged that engagement with this sort of 
artwork ought to establish a nuanced critical standard, one which recognises that 
photographic use, re-use and mis-use has always been a source of anxiety: ‘rather than 
collapsing into an easy relativism in which any reading is as good as any other there is 
an understanding that a reflexive knowledge demands we include the archival within the 
frame rather than leaving it outside’ (Campany, 2003).  
Thinking sensitively might offer a promising way through the darker territory in which 
criminal evidence sometimes dwells after the conclusion of proceedings. Establishing a 
conceptual and ethical practice that recognises sensitivity gives crimino-legal scholars 
critical tools for responding to this cultural work. Rather than excluding the work 
altogether – as not art, or unfit for display – a better dialogue might emerge from the 
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place where our fascinations co-exist. Criminal conduct, and its investigation and proof, 
have long been viewed through a cultural lens, and this lens can reflect back upon 
evidentiary doctrine. Cultural interventions upon criminal evidence help us understand 
how the rules of admissibility, exceptions, prohibitions and protections – collectively – 
represent sites of sensitivity and confidence within legal discourse. A legal rule-bound 
approach to evidence closely guards concepts such as ‘relevance’, ‘reliability’, ‘first-
hand’, ‘remote’, ‘prejudice’, ‘unfair’, ‘improper’, ‘danger’, the distinction between 
‘fact’ and ‘opinion’, the distinction between a ‘tendency’ and a ‘coincidence’, the 
distinction between ‘testimony’ and the ‘credibility’ of the witness who gives it, and the 
special status of the criminal accused. Further, the law creates separate rules for 
evidence in the form of a ‘witness’, a ‘document’, or a ‘real’ evidence. These are 
categories that do not survive as distinct within the cultural field, and so law’s 
distinctions demand scrutiny. Approaching these concepts culturally might disclose how 
narrow and contested are law’s fact-finding processes, and how vulnerable these might 
be when situated outside the protective ambit of evidentiary rules.  
A cultural framework reminds the evidence scholar that, whereas questions of 
admissibility are determined on an in/out basis – evidence is admissible or it is excluded 
– more troubling and fascinating are the processes of reasoning with evidence. 
Following the interventions into the field made by William Twining, who cautioned 
against a focus on rules and urged an examination of the spaces between fact and value, 
fact and law, reason and intuition (Twining, 2006: 7), we can also see the potential for 
cultural perspectives to assist us in remaining sensitive to the ways we attribute worth or 
weight to evidence. It is at this level of evidentiary discourse that a cultural lens might 
focus; here is where decision-making is most fragile and uncertain, where the processes 
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behind judgment reside and are concealed. Cultural engagement with criminal evidence 
discloses new ways of seeing what criminal evidence is, but moreso our sensitivities to 
what it does. And crucially, it reminds us that we can be judged by what we do with it.  
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